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1. INTRODUCTION
It is increasingly common for organizations to computerize their business and man-
agement processes. The co-ordination of the tasks or steps that comprise a comput-
erized business process is managed by a workflow management system (or business
process management system). A simple, illustrative example for purchase order pro-
cessing [Crampton et al. 2013] is shown in Figure 1 (on page 3). In the first step of the
workflow, the purchase order is created and approved (and then dispatched to the sup-
1A preliminary version of this paper appeared at IPEC 2015 [Crampton et al. 2015]. For a description of the
differences between the two versions, see the last paragraph of Section 1.
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plier). The supplier will submit an invoice for the goods ordered, which is processed by
the create payment step. When the supplier delivers the goods, a goods received note
(GRN) must be signed and countersigned. Only then may the payment be approved
and sent to the supplier. Note that a workflow specification need not be linear: the
processing of the GRN and of the invoice can occur in parallel, for example.
Typically, the execution of a step in a workflow instance will be triggered by a human
user, or a software agent acting under the control of a human user, and each step may
only be executed by an authorized user. Thus a workflow specification will include
an authorization policy defining which users are authorized to perform which steps.
Such a policy may be specified directly as a relation associating each user with those
steps for which the user is authorized. Alternatively, one may specify a set of roles,
associating each role with the steps for which that role is authorized, and associating
each user with the roles for which the user is authorized. We could, for example, define
a financeClerk role which is authorized for the create payment step.
In addition, many workflows require controls on the users that perform certain sets
of steps [American National Standards Institute 2004; Basin et al. 2014; Bertino et al.
1999; Brewer and Nash 1989; Crampton 2005; Wang and Li 2010]. In the context of
our purchase order workflow, these controls seek to prevent fraudulent use of the pur-
chase order processing system. The controls are specified as constraints on users that
can perform pairs of steps in the workflow. Examples include the same user must not
sign and countersign the GRN; and the same user must create the purchase order and
sign the associated GRN. These and other similar constraints are illustrated in Fig-
ure 1(b). Such constraints are said to be user-independent because the satisfaction of
these constraints is not dependent on specific user identities. The first constraint, for
example, is satisfied provided any two users are involved in signing and countersigning
the GRN.
However, there are constraints, of practical value, that are not user-independent.
Similarly, there are business rules that cannot be expressed using user-independent
constraints. It is common, for example, for an organization to be partitioned into de-
partments (or similar) and each department to be partitioned into sections (or similar).
Then we might wish to impose the following rules on purchase order processing.
— The create purchase order and sign GRN steps in a workflow instance must be
performed by users in the same section. (This replaces, and is a weakening of, the
requirement that these steps be performed by the same user.)
— The create and approve purchase steps in a workflow instance must be performed
by users in the same department. (This augments the constraint that the users
performing these steps must be different.)
— The sign and countersign GRN steps in a workflow instance must be performed
by users in the same department but those users must not belong to the same sec-
tion. (This is a strengthening of the requirement that these steps be performed by
different users.)
— The create purchase order and create payment steps must be performed by users
in different departments. (This replaces, and is a strengthening of, the requirement
that these steps be performed by different users.)
— The approve purchase order and approve payment steps must be performed by
users in different departments. (This is an additional constraint.)
There is little work in the literature on constraints of this form, although prior work
has recognized that such constraints are likely to be important in practice [Cramp-
ton 2005; Wang and Li 2010], and it has been shown that even simple constraints of
this form present additional difficulties when incorporated into WSP [Crampton et al.
2013].
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
































s1 create purchase order 6= different users must perform steps
s2 approve purchase order = same user must perform steps
s3 sign GRN 1 users in different departments must perform steps
s4 create payment ∼1 users in the same department must perform steps
s5 countersign GRN 2 users in different sections must perform steps
s6 approve payment ∼2 users in the same section must perform steps
(d) Legend
Fig. 1. A simple constrained workflow for purchase order processing
It is also important to note that there is no obvious way to enforce the requirements
listed above by specifying an authorization policy. In particular, role-based access con-
trol – a natural choice for specifying an authorization policy for a workflow (by au-
thorizing roles to perform steps and users to activate roles) – does not distinguish be-
tween users, much less sections or departments. Suppose, for example, that every user
at the clerk level in a hierarchical organization (having many different departments)
is authorized to create purchase orders (step s1) and sign GRNs (step s3). It would be
natural to define a role r1, which is authorized for steps s1 and s3, and authorize clerks
for this role. Similarly, we might authorize every user at administrator level for role
r2, which is authorized to countersign GRNs (step s5).
We note, in passing, that we could assign users to “organizational” (rather than
“functional”) roles on the basis of membership in different departments and sections.
Thus, we can distinguish between two users u1 and u2, each assigned to role r1, and
belonging to departments d1 and d2, respectively. However, to ensure that two steps
s1 and s4 are executed by users assigned to r1 but belonging to different departments
by specifying constraints on the organizational roles involved in the execution of s1
and s4, we would need to specify multiple constraints, one for each pair of department
roles. In other words, while it may be possible to articulate some of the constraints in
Figure 1 in terms of roles, it is more natural and compact to express these constraints
in terms of equivalence relations on the set of users, and checking the satisfaction of
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those constraints will be more efficient. More generally, roles (in the context of role-
based access control) and constraints defined in terms of organizational structure are
best suited for enforcing rather different security requirements.
We model hierarchical organization structures as nested equivalence relations (each
of which induces a partition of the set of users). We then generalize the definition
of a user-independent constraint to a class-independent constraint. Returning to our
purchase order processing example, let us write u ∼1 v if and only if users u and v
belong to the same department, and u ∼2 v if and only if u and v belong to the same
section. Then we may represent the constraints listed above in terms of ∼1 and ∼2, as
shown schematically in Figure 1(c).
The existence of an authorization policy and constraints on the execution of work-
flow steps may mean it is impossible to find a valid plan – an assignment of authorized
users to workflow steps such that all constraints are satisfied. The WORKFLOW SATIS-
FIABILITY PROBLEM (WSP) takes a workflow specification as input and outputs a valid
plan if one exists. WSP is known to be NP-hard, even when the set of constraints only
includes very simple constraints [Wang and Li 2010]. Clearly, it is important to be able
to determine whether a workflow specification is satisfiable at design time. Equally,
when users select steps to execute in a workflow instance, it is essential that the ac-
cess control mechanism can determine whether (a) the user is authorized to execute
the step, and (b) allowing the user to execute the step does not render the instance
unsatisfiable. Thus, the access control mechanism must incorporate an algorithm to
solve WSP, and that algorithm needs to be as efficient as possible.
Wang and Li [2010] observed that, in practice, the number k of steps in a workflow
will be small, relative to the size of the input to WSP; specifically, the number of users
is likely to be an order of magnitude greater than the number of steps. This obser-
vation led them to set k as the parameter and to study the problem using tools from
parameterized complexity. In doing so, they proved that the problem is fixed-parameter
tractable (FPT) for simple classes of constraints. However, Wang and Li also showed
that in general WSP is fixed-parameter intractable (subject to a widely accepted com-
plexity theory hypothesis). Recent research has made significant progress in identi-
fying those classes of constraints for which WSP remains FPT. In particular, Cohen
et al. [2014] proved that WSP is FPT if all constraints are user-independent. We pro-
vide a brief overview of fixed-parameter tractability and known results for WSP in
Section 2.4.
In this paper, we extend the notion of a user-independent constraint to that of a
class-independent constraint with respect to an equivalence relation on the set of users
(such as belonging to the same department). In particular, every user-independent con-
straint is an instance of a class-independent constraint with respect to the identity re-
lation. An equivalence relation ∼ is said to be a refinement of an equivalence relation
∼′ if any two elements that are equivalent under ∼ are also equivalent under ∼′. A
sequence {∼1, . . . ,∼r} of equivalence relations is said to be nested if ∼q+1 is a refine-
ment of ∼q for each q ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}. Our second contribution is to demonstrate that
patterns for user-independent constraints [Cohen et al. 2014] can be generalized to
patterns for class-independent constraints with respect to a set of nested equivalence
relations – that is, every constraint is class-independent with respect to an equiva-
lence relation ∼q from a nested sequence {∼1, . . . ,∼r}. The resulting algorithm, using
these new patterns, remains FPT (irrespective of the authorization policy), although
its running time is somewhat slower than that of the algorithm for WSP with user-
independent constraints only (and r must be included as an additional parameter). In
short, our first two contributions identify a large class of constraints for which WSP is
shown to be FPT, and subsume prior work on user-independent constraints [Crampton
et al. 2013; Cohen et al. 2014; Karapetyan et al. 2015; Wang and Li 2010]. Our final
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contribution is an implementation of our algorithm in order to investigate whether the
theoretical advantages implied by its fixed-parameter tractability can be realized in
practice. We compare the performance of our FPT algorithm with that of SAT4J, an
off-the-shelf pseudo-Boolean SAT solver, for solving WSP. The results of our experi-
ments suggest that our FPT algorithm enjoys some significant advantages over SAT4J
for hard instances of WSP.
In the next section, we define WSP and user-independent constraints in more for-
mal terms, discuss related work in more detail, and introduce the notion of class-
independent constraints. In Section 3 we state our main theoretical result, which is
that WSP is fixed-parameter tractable when all constraints are class-independent with
respect to nested equivalence relations on r levels. The foundation of our main algo-
rithm is the concept of nested equivalence relation patterns. We establish that every
nested equivalence relation plan has a pattern, and that to check whether a plan sat-
isfies all constraints it is enough to consider the nested equivalence relation pattern
corresponding to that plan. Thus our main algorithm will focus on nested equivalence
relation patterns, as the number of such patterns is much smaller than the number
of possible plans. In Section 4, we describe an implementation of our algorithm and
report the results of our experiments. We summarize our results in Section 5.
There are four main differences between this version of the paper, and the earlier
conference version [Crampton et al. 2015]:
(1) we provide a full description of our approach for an arbitrary number r of nested
equivalence relations, unlike the conference version which only considers the case
r = 2;
(2) we significantly improve the upper bound on the complexity of our algorithm with
respect to r (our new bound indicates that the dependency of the running time on r
is much weaker than previously assumed);
(3) we improve the efficiency of our algorithm implementation; and
(4) we consider a wider range of WSP instances in our computational experiments,
specifically considering WSP instances with fewer constraints and larger numbers
of steps.
2. PRELIMINARIES AND RELATED WORK
Work on authorization constraints as a means of implementing security requirements
in workflow systems was first studied in the seminal paper by Bertino et al. [1999]. A
considerable amount of research now exists on the topic, extending the work of Bertino
et al. in a variety of ways, including more complex constraints [Crampton et al. 2013;
Cohen et al. 2014]; more complex control flow in the workflow specification [Basin
et al. 2014; Yang et al. 2014]; and the complexity of algorithms required to evaluate
authorization requests [Crampton et al. 2013; Cohen et al. 2014; Karapetyan et al.
2015; Wang and Li 2010].
In this paper, we extend results on the fixed-parameter tractability of WSP to in-
clude workflow specifications containing class-independent constraints. Accordingly,
we adopt an existing and well-established model for a constrained workflow autho-
rization schema [Crampton et al. 2013].
A workflow specification is a partially ordered set of steps (S,6). The partial order
determines the control flow: that is, the order in which workflow steps must be exe-
cuted. In particular, if s < s′ then s must be performed before s′ in any instance of
the workflow; and if s ≮ s′ and s ≯ s′ then s and s′ may be performed in either order.
Our definition of workflow specification does not permit repetition of steps (loops) or
repetition of sub-workflows (cycles). Nor do we consider workflows where the control
flow includes exclusive branching: that is, of two parallel branches only one branch is
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executed in any given instance of the workflow. Informally, we omit control flow pat-
terns that mean the set of steps in a given workflow instance is not fully determined
in advance. However, these omissions do not have significant theoretical implications.
Recent work has shown that workflow specifications with control flows that lead to
indeterminism can be handled by “unwinding” the workflow specification to produce
multiple (deterministic) workflow specifications [Crampton and Gutin 2013; Yang et al.
2014].
Given a workflow specification (S,6) and a set of users U , an authorization policy
for (S,6) is a relation A ⊆ S × U , which we may represent as a set of authorization
lists A = {A(u) : u ∈ U}, where A(u) = {s ∈ S : (s, u) ∈ A}. User u is authorized to
perform step s only if (s, u) ∈ A.2 We assume that for every step s ∈ S there exists some
user u ∈ U such that (s, u) ∈ A. A workflow authorization schema is a tuple (S,U,6, A),
where (S,6) is a workflow specification and A is an authorization policy for (S,6).
We are interested in assigning users to steps subject to a given authorization policy
and constraints. We may be interested in simply confirming that such an assignment
exists to ensure that workflow instances can be completed. However, in a more dynamic
setting, we may also be interested in determining whether allowing a user’s request to
execute a particular step in a workflow instance would make it impossible to complete
the workflow instance (while complying with the authorization policy and constraints).
In other words, among the set Π(S,U) of all functions from S to U , there are some
that represent “legitimate” assignments of steps to users and some that do not. The
legitimacy or otherwise of a particular assignment is determined by the authorization
policy and the constraints that complete the workflow specification. Formally, a con-
straint c ∈ C may be viewed as a pair (T,Θ), where T ⊆ S is the scope of c and Θ is a
set of functions from T to U , specifying the assignments of steps in T to users in U that
satisfy the constraint. In practice, we do not enumerate all the elements of Θ. Instead,
we define its members implicitly using some constraint-specific syntax. For example,
we write (s, s′, ρ), where s, s′ ∈ S and ρ is a binary relation defined on U , to denote a
constraint that has scope {s, s′} and is satisfied by any assignment pi : S → U such that
(pi(s), pi(s′)) ∈ ρ. In particular, (s, s′, 6=) requires s and s′ to be performed by different
users (and so represents a separation-of-duty constraint). Similarly, (s, s′,=) requires
that s and s′ be performed by the same user (a binding-of-duty constraint).
2.1. The Workflow Satisfiability Problem
A plan is a function in Π(S,U). Given a workflow W = (S,U,A, C), a plan pi is autho-
rized if for all s ∈ S, s ∈ A(pi(s)), i.e. the user assigned to s is authorized for s. A plan
pi is eligible if for all (T,Θ) ∈ C, pi|T ∈ Θ, i.e. every constraint is satisfied.3 A plan pi is
valid if it is both authorized and eligible. In the workflow satisfiability problem (WSP),
we are given a workflow (specification) W , and our aim is to decide whether W has a
valid plan. If W has a valid plan, W is satisfiable; otherwise, W is unsatisfiable.4
2In practice, the set of authorized step-user pairs,A, will not be defined explicitly. Instead, A will be inferred
from other access control data structures. In particular, R2BAC – the role-and-relation-based access control
model of Wang and Li [2010] – introduces a set of roles R, a user-role relation UR ⊆ U × R and a role-step
relation SA ⊆ R × S from which it is possible to derive the steps for which users are authorized. For all
common access control policies (including R2BAC), it is straightforward to derive A. We prefer to use A in
order to simplify the exposition.
3Given a plan pi : S → U and a subset T of S, pi|T denotes the function with domain T such that pi|T (s) =
pi(s) for all s ∈ T .
4WSP has many similarities to the Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP). In fact, WSP, is exactly the
conservative CSP (i.e., CSP with arbitrary unary constraints, corresponding to step authorizations in the
WSP terminology). However, unlike a typical instance of CSP, where the number of variables is significantly
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Notice that our definition of a plan is independent of the ordering on the steps. We
could, in principle, define a plan to be a pair (pi, `), where ` is a list of steps, indicating
the order in which steps should be executed (for that plan). For such a definition to be
meaningful, this would imply that for some pi : S → U , there exist lists of steps ` and
`′ such that (pi, `) is a valid plan and (pi, `′) is not. We have never seen any constraints
or workflow specifications, either in practice or in the research literature, where this
situation arises. Henceforth, therefore, we will ignore the ordering on workflow steps,
as it is irrelevant to the construction of a valid plan.
We assume that in all instances of WSP we consider, all constraints can be checked
in time polynomial in n. Thus it takes polynomial time to check whether any plan is
eligible. The correctness of our algorithm is unaffected by this assumption, but using
constraints not checkable in polynomial time would naturally affect the running time.
All constraints of practical interest known to us satisfy this assumption.
Table I. A simple authorization policy
dept1 dept2
section11 section12 section21 section22
u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 u6 u7 u8 u9
s1 1 1 1 1 1
s2 1 1 1
s3 1 1 1
s4 1 1
s5 1 1 1
s6 1 1
Example 2.1. Table I shows a simple authorization policy. Consider this policy
in conjunction with the workflow specification and the user-independent constraints
shown in Figures 1(a) and 1(b), respectively. Then the following plan is valid:
pi(s1) = pi(s3) = u1; pi(s2) = pi(s4) = pi(s5) = u8; pi(s6) = u9. (1)
Table I also illustrates the partitioning of the user set into departments and sections.
Note that we cannot construct a valid plan using only users from dept1, since no user
is authorized for s6. Equally, we cannot construct a valid plan using only users from
dept2, since no user is authorized for both s1 and s3.
A partial plan pi is a function from a subset T of S to U . In particular, a plan is
a partial plan. To avoid confusion, we may refer to a plan pi : S → U as a complete
plan. We extend the definitions of eligible, authorized and valid to partial plans in the
natural way: the only difference is that we only consider authorizations for steps in T
and constraints with scope being a subset of T .
An algorithm to solve WSP is important because it can establish whether a workflow
specification is satisfiable. Clearly, a specification that is not satisfiable is of little prac-
tical use.5 Moreover, we can use the algorithm as a sub-routine in a run-time reference
monitor, to determine whether allowing a user to execute a workflow step would ren-
der a workflow instance unsatisfiable [Crampton and Gutin 2013, Section 2.2]. Hence,
it is important to develop algorithms to solve WSP that are as efficient as possible.
larger than the number of values, a typical instance of WSP has many more values (i.e., users) than variables
(i.e., steps).
5Note we can test whether a specification is satisfiable in the absence of an authorization policy. Any plan re-
quires at most k users, so if no authorization policy is available, we may simply consider a set of k “abstract”
users, each of which is authorized for all steps. If the resulting specification is unsatisfiable, the specification
will be unsatisfiable for any other authorization policy.
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2.2. Constraints using Equivalence Relations
Crampton et al. [2013] introduced constraints defined in terms of an equivalence re-
lation ∼ on U : a plan pi satisfies constraint (s, s′,∼) if pi(s) ∼ pi(s′) (and satisfies con-
straint (s, s′,) if pi(s)  pi(s′)). Hence, we could, for example, specify the pair of con-
straints (s, s′, 6=) and (s, s′,∼), which, collectively, require that s and s′ are performed
by different users that belong to the same equivalence class with respect to ∼. As we
noted in the introduction, such constraints are very natural in the context of organiza-
tions that partition the set of users into departments, sections, groups or teams.
Crampton et al. [2013, Theorem 5.4] proved that WSP remains FPT when some
simple extensions of constraints (s, s′,∼) and (s, s′,) are included. Our extension of
constraints (s, s′,∼) and (s, s′,) is much more general: it is similar to generalizing
simple constraints (s, s′,=) and (s, s′, 6=) to the wide class of user-independent con-
straints [Cohen et al. 2014]. This leads, in particular, to a significant generalization of
Theorem 5.4 in [Crampton et al. 2013].
Let c = (T,Θ) be a constraint and let ∼ be an equivalence relation on U . Let U∼
denote the set of equivalence classes induced by ∼ and let u∼ ∈ U∼ denote the equiva-
lence class containing u. Then, for any function pi : S → U , we may define the function
pi∼ : S → U∼, where pi∼(s) = (pi(s))∼. If, for example, pi(s1) = u1, then (using the
partitions defined in Table I), we have
pi∼1(s1) = dept1 and pi
∼2(s1) = section11.
In particular, ∼ induces a set of functions Θ∼ = {θ∼ : θ ∈ Θ}.
Informally, given an equivalence relation ∼ on U , we say a constraint c is class-
independent if, for each plan pi that satisfies c, for each step s, and for each permutation
pi of equivalence classes in U∼, replacing pi(s) by any user in the class φ(pi(s)∼) results
in a valid plan. More formally, c = (T,Θ) is class-independent (CI) for ∼ (or simply
∼-independent) if for any function θ, θ∼ ∈ Θ∼ implies θ ∈ Θ, and for any permutation
φ : U∼ → U∼, θ∼ ∈ Θ∼ implies φ ◦ θ∼ ∈ Θ∼. In particular, constraints of the form
(s, s′,∼) and (s, s′,) are ∼-independent.
We say a constraint is user-independent (UI) if it is CI for the identity relation. (In
particular, every UI constraint is CI.) In other words, if a plan pi : s 7→ pi(s) satisfies
a UI constraint c and we replace any user in {pi(s) : s ∈ S} by an arbitrary user
such that the replacement users are all distinct, then the new plan satisfies c. Many
constraints of practical interest, such as separation-of-duty, binding-of-duty and cardi-
nality constraints are user-independent.
Example 2.2. Table I illustrates two partitions of the set of users, one into two
departments, the other into four sections. Now consider these partitions and the class-
independent constraints defined in Figure 1(c). We can satisfy all the constraints in
Figure 1(c) by:
— allocating users from dept1 to steps s1, s2, s3 and s5, ensuring that the users al-
located to steps s1 and s2 are different and the users allocated to steps s3 and s5
belong to different sections;
— allocating two users from dept2 to steps s4 and s6, ensuring that the users allocated
to these steps are different.
Notice that we could equally well allocate steps s1, s2, s3 and s5 to users from dept2 and
steps s4 and s6 to users from dept1. Equally, it doesn’t matter which specific sections
the users allocated to steps s3 and s5 belong to, only that the sections are distinct. In
other words, these are class-independent constraints.
In terms of constructing a plan, notice that the plan defined in (1) is no longer valid
because it violates the constraints (s1, s2,∼2) and (s3, s5,∼1). The workflow is, never-
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theless, satisfiable. The following plan, for example, is valid:
pi1(s1) = pi1(s3) = u1; pi1(s2) = u2; pi1(s5) = u4; pi1(s4) = u8; pi1(s6) = u9. (2)
2.3. Nested equivalence relations and WSP
Many organizations have a hierarchical structure and may wish to define operational
constraints based on that structure. We now explain, based on material previously
published by Crampton et al. [2013], how such structures may be modeled using equiv-
alence relations.
We will write [m] to denote the set {1, . . . ,m} for any integer m > 1. For a set X,
we say (B1, . . . , B`) is a partition of X if B1 ∪ · · · ∪ B` = X, Bi 6= ∅ all i ∈ [`], and
Bi ∩Bj = ∅ for all i 6= j ∈ [`]. We refer to the sets Bi as blocks. Let B = (B1, . . . , B`) and
B′ = (B′1, . . . , B′`′) be partitions of X. We say that B′ is a refinement of B if every block ofB′ is contained in a block of B. The set of equivalence classes of an equivalence relation
on X defines a partition of X. Hence, we may speak unambiguously of one equivalence
class being a refinement of another. We say a sequence (P1, . . . ,Pr) of partitions of a set
X is a nested partition (in r levels) if Pi is a refinement of Pj for all i > j. Similarly, we
say a series of equivalence relations ∼1, . . . ,∼r is nested if the partition of X defined
by ∼i is a refinement of the partition of X defined by ∼j for all i > j, i.e. the partitions
induced by the equivalence relations form a nested partition. Two special cases are
worth mentioning: the trivial relation, where u ∼ v if and only if u and v belong to the
set of users; and the equality relation, where u ∼ v if and only if u = v. The former
equivalence relation induces a single equivalence class containing every user, so any
other partition of U is a refinement of this partition. The latter induces an equivalence
class for each user, and the resulting partition refines every other partition.
Modern organizations typically have a hierarchical structure, the organization being
successively divided into increasingly fine-grained organizational units. An organiza-
tion might, for example, have divisions, which are split into departments, which are
split into sections, which are split into teams. We may represent such an organization
by defining a number of nested equivalence relations: u ∼1 v iff u and v belong to the
same organization, u ∼2 v iff u and v belong to the same division, etc. A simple exam-
ple of this kind of organization into departments and sections (and individual users) is
shown in Table I.
As we illustrated in Figure 1(c), many security requirements can be expressed in
terms of constraints of the form “the users that perform these steps must belong to
different equivalence classes” or “the users that perform these steps must belong to
the same equivalence class”; all such constraints are class-independent. (Moreover,
such constraints cannot be expressed in terms of user-independent constraints.) It is
possible, for example, to specify the requirement that two steps are performed by users
belonging to the same department but to different sections within that department. In
short, the use of nested equivalence relations to model organizations and constraints
defined over the resulting equivalence classes extend considerably the expressivity of
workflow specifications.
ASSUMPTION 1. Unless stated otherwise, we assume throughout the paper that all
constraints are ∼q-independent for some q ∈ [r]. Furthermore, we assume we are given
a series of nested relations {∼1, . . . ,∼r} as part of the input.
ASSUMPTION 2. We may assume without loss of generality that ∼r is the equality
relation; that is, all ∼r-independent constraints are user-independent.6
6If this assumption did not hold then we may always add the equality relation as ∼r+1 (which trivially
refines ∼r), with no user-independent constraints. This has the effect on our algorithm’s running time of
increasing r by 1.
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Recall the definitions of U∼, u∼, pi∼ with respect to an equivalence relation ∼. When
considering the sequence (∼1, . . . ,∼r) of equivalence relations, we will abuse notation
slightly in the interests of clarity and write U∼q in place of U∼q . Similarly, we will
write u∼q for u∼q and pi∼q for pi∼q .
We conclude this section with a claim whose simple proof is omitted.
PROPOSITION 2.3. Given two equivalence relations ∼ and ≈ such that ∼ is a re-
finement of ≈, and any plan pi : S → U , pi∼(s) = pi∼(s′) implies pi≈(s) = pi≈(s′).
2.4. FPT Results for WSP
Wang and Li [2010] showed that WSP is NP-hard by a reduction from GRAPH COLOR-
ING. However, they also noted that the number of steps k is generally much smaller
than the size of the input to WSP. In particular, k is typically an order of magnitude
smaller than the number of users n. Accordingly, they studied the fixed-parameter
tractability of WSP using k as the parameter. We now provide a brief introduction to
fixed-parameter tractability and a survey of the FPT results that are known for WSP.
An algorithm that solves an NP-hard problem in time O(f(k)Nd), where N denotes
the size of the input to the problem, k is some (small) parameter of the problem, f is
some function in k only, and d is some constant (independent of k and N ), is said to
be fixed-parameter tractable (FPT). If a problem can be solved using an FPT algorithm
then we say that it is an FPT problem and that it belongs to the class FPT. Throughout
the paper, we will use theO∗ notation to suppress polynomial factors: that is, a function
g(n, r, k) = O∗(f(n, r, k)) if g(n, r, k) = O(f(n, r, k)(n + r + k)d) for some constant d.
Throughout this paper, all log values are given in base 2. The total size of the input to
WSP is determined by n, k, c and r, denoting the number of users, steps, constraints
and equivalence relations, respectively.
There exists an infinite collection of parameterized complexity classes,
W[1],W[2], . . . , with FPT ⊆ W[1] ⊆ W[2] ⊆ · · · . Informally, a parameterized
problem belongs to the complexity class W[i] if there exists an FPT algorithm that
transforms every instance of the problem into an instance of WEIGHTED CIRCUIT
SATISFIABILITY for a circuit of depth i + 1, of which i levels have unbounded fan-in.
FPT is the class W[0]; the problem INDEPENDENT SET, for example, is in W[1]. It is
widely-believed and generally assumed that FPT 6= W[1] (see, for example, Flum and
Grohe [2006]).
Wang and Li [2010, Lemma 8] showed, using an elementary argument, that WSP is
FPT when all constraints have the form (s, s′, 6=) and can be solved in time O∗(kk+1).
They also proved that WSP is W[1]-hard in general, using a reduction from INDEPEN-
DENT SET [Wang and Li 2010, Theorem 10]. Crampton et al. [2013] introduced the
notion of a “regular” constraint7, subsuming those constraints studied by Wang and Li
for which WSP was known to be FPT. They developed an FPT algorithm to solve WSP
when all constraints are regular whose running time, O∗(2k), significantly improved
on that obtained by Wang and Li. They also studied WSP in the presence of constraints
defined over nested equivalence relations defined on the set of users and proved that
WSP remains FPT.
Recent work by Cohen et al. [2014] has introduced the notion of a pattern, an ab-
straction of a plan, which leads to a significant reduction in the search space and
improved running times for FPT algorithms for WSP. As a result, Cohen et al. [2014]
were able to show that WSP is FPT when all constraints are UI. Using a modified
pattern approach, Karapetyan et al. [2015] obtained a short proof that WSP with only
UI constraints is FPT and designed a very efficient algorithm for WSP with UI con-
7Regular constraints are a special family of UI constraints.
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straints. In this paper, we show that WSP remains FPT when all constraints are CI
and we generalize patterns to develop the fastest known FPT algorithms for WSP in
the presence of constraints defined over nested equivalence relations.
3. AN FPT ALGORITHM FOR WSP WITH CI CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we will prove our main theoretical result:
THEOREM 3.1. WSP with nested class-independent constraints in r levels and with
k steps is FPT with a running time of O∗(2k log(rk)).
In particular, note that when r is small enough relative to k (e.g. when r is a
constant), the dominant term in the exponent is just k log k. Recently, it was shown
that (under a standard complexity assumption) even the basic case of WSP with only
UI constraints admits no algorithm with a running time of O∗(2(1−ε)k log k) for any
ε > 0 [Gutin and Wahlstro¨m 2015]. Hence, for small r, the bound in Theorem 3.1 is
close to optimal.
In Section 3.1 we introduce the concept of patterns, which form the foundation of our
main algorithm. We establish that every plan has a pattern, and that to check whether
a plan is eligible it is enough to consider its pattern. The pattern of a plan depends on
the type of constraints under consideration. In our case, for each equivalence relation
∼q, q ∈ [r], we define a ∼q-pattern for any plan, and then define a nested equivalence
relation (NER-) pattern as a sequence of ∼q-patterns.
As the number of patterns is much smaller than the number of possible plans, we
will solve WSP by considering patterns instead of plans. We will show in Section 3.1
that the eligibility of a plan can be determined from its NER-pattern. In Section 3.2,
we describe an efficient method of enumerating a minimal set of NER-patterns that
need to be considered. Given an eligible NER-pattern, it is not necessarily the case
that a WSP instance has a solution, as there may be no plan with the correspond-
ing NER-pattern that is also authorized. Thus we also have to check whether a given
NER-pattern is the NER-pattern of an authorized plan. We say that such a pattern is
realizable, and we show in Section 3.3 how to check whether a NER-pattern is realiz-
able. These results are combined to give our main algorithm in Section 3.4.
3.1. Plans and Patterns
If a constraint is CI then, by definition, the mapping of steps to equivalence classes by
a plan may be assumed to be independent of the specific equivalence classes chosen.
All that matters is that certain steps are mapped to the same equivalence class, while
other are mapped to different ones. In the case of the constraints shown in Figure 1(c),
for example, any eligible plan must map the create purchase order and approve pur-
chase order steps to (users in) the same section, while the sign GRN and countersign
GRN steps must be allocated to different sections. (Notice that the department-level
constraint that the create purchase order and create payment steps be executed by
users in different departments necessarily requires that these steps are executed by
users in different sections, because of the nesting of equivalence relations.) The con-
cept of a pattern, which provides a “template” for an eligible plan has proved to be
very important in the study of WSP with UI constraints. In this section, we explain
how patterns can be generalized to WSP with constraints defined over nested equiva-
lence relations.
LetW = (S,U,A, C = C1∪· · ·∪Cr) be a workflow, where Cq is a set of∼q-independent
constraints for each q ∈ [r]. Consider a vector p = (x1, . . . , xk), where xi ∈ [k] for all
i ∈ [k]. Such a vector may be used to define an equivalence relation ≈p on S, where
si ≈p sj if and only if xi = xj . Conversely, any plan pi : S → U may be used to define
an equivalence relation ≈pi,q on S, where si ≈pi,q sj if and only if pi(si) ∼q pi(sj). We
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say p is a ∼q-pattern for pi if the set of equivalence classes induced by ≈p equals the
set induced by ≈pi,q. We say p is eligible for Cq if any plan pi with p as its ∼q-pattern
is eligible for Cq. An (eligible) pattern for ∼2 in our running example is (1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 2),
indicating that steps s1, s2 and s3 should be allocated to the same section, s5 should
be allocated to a different section, and s4 and s6 should be allocated to a third distinct
section; the plan pi1, defined in (2), has this ∼2-pattern.
PROPOSITION 3.2. Let pq be a ∼q-pattern for a plan pi, for some q ∈ [r]. Then pq is
eligible for Cq if and only if pi is eligible for Cq.
PROOF. Suppose that pi is eligible for Cq. We show that for any plan pi0 that has pq
as its ∼q-pattern, pi0 is eligible for Cq, and so pq is eligible for Cq.
Let pq = (p(q,1), . . . , p(q,k)). Observe that for any si, sj , we have
pi(si) ∼q pi(sj)⇔ p(q,i) = p(q,j)
⇔ pi0(si) ∼q pi0(sj)
Then define a permutation φ : U∼q → U∼q as follows: φ(u∼q) = pi∼q0 (si) if there exists
si ∈ S such that pi∼q(si) = u∼q, and φ(u∼q) = u∼q otherwise. As pi∼q0 (si) = pi∼q0 (sj) for
any si, sj such that pi∼q(si) = pi∼q(sj) = u∼q, φ is well-defined. Furthermore pi∼q0 =
φ ◦ pi∼q.
Then it follows from the definition of a class-independent constraint that for any
c = (T,Θ) ∈ Cq,
pi|T ∈ Θ⇔ pi∼q|T ∈ Θ∼q
⇔ φ ◦ (pi∼q|T ) ∈ Θ∼q
⇔ pi∼q0 |T ∈ Θ∼q
⇔ pi0|T ∈ Θ.
Since pi satisfies every constraint in Cq, pi0 satisfies every constraint in Cq and so pi0
is eligible for Cq, as required.
For the converse, it follows by definition that if pq is eligible for Cq then pi is eligible
for Cq.
Now let p = (p1, . . . , pr) be a series of patterns (where for each q ∈ [r], pq is to be inter-
preted as a ∼q-pattern). Then we call p a nested equivalence relation (NER-) pattern.
We say that p is a NER-pattern for pi if pq is a ∼q-pattern for pi, for each q ∈ [r]. We say
that p is eligible for C = C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Cr if pq is eligible for Cq for each q ∈ [r].
Example 3.3. Consider the plan from Example 2.2:
pi1(s1) = pi1(s3) = u1; pi1(s2) = u2; pi1(s5) = u4; pi1(s4) = u8; pi1(s6) = u9.
Then the following patterns are associated with this plan:
— for∼1 we have the pattern (1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2) (since the steps s1, s2, s3 and s5 are mapped
to users in dept1, while the remaining two steps are mapped to users in dept2);
— for ∼2 we have the pattern (1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 2) (here s5 is mapped to a user in a different
section from the users performing s1, s2 and s3);
— and for = (that is, ∼3 in this example) we have the pattern (1, 2, 1, 3, 4, 5).
Thus the NER-pattern associated with this plan is
((1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2), (1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 2), (1, 2, 1, 3, 4, 5)).
The next two results follow immediately from Proposition 3.2 and the definition of
∼q-patterns.
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LEMMA 3.4. Let p = (p1, . . . , pr) be a NER-pattern for a plan pi. Then p is eligible
for C = C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Cr if and only if pi is eligible for Cq for each q ∈ [r].
PROPOSITION 3.5. There is a NER-pattern p for every plan pi.
We now introduce further terminology related to NER-patterns. We say a NER-
pattern p = (p1, . . . , pr) is realizable if there exists a plan pi such that pi is authorized
and p is a NER-pattern for pi. We say p is consistent if for any pa = (p(a,1) . . . , p(a,k))
and pb = (p(b,1), . . . , p(b,k)) with a > b, and any i, j ∈ [k], we have p(a,i) = p(a,j) implies
p(b,i) = p(b,j). Recall that if p is the NER-pattern for a plan pi, then p(a,i) = p(a,j) iff
pi(si) ∼a pi(sj), and similarly p(b,i) = p(b,j) iff pi(si) ∼b pi(sj). Thus Proposition 2.3 im-
plies that if p is the NER-pattern for some plan, then p is consistent. Take the plan
from Examples 2.2 and 3.3, which yields the following NER-pattern:
((1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2), (1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 2), (1, 2, 1, 3, 4, 5)).
By inspection, we can see that if two elements in one tuple are equal, then the same
two elements in any tuple to its left are also equal. In other words, this NER-pattern
is consistent (as one would expect, given that the plan from which it is derived is
valid). Notice that this NER-pattern (and indeed any consistent NER-pattern) induces
nested partitions on the set of steps. In this example, the ∼1-pattern yields the parti-
tion {{s1, s2, s3, s5} , {s4, s6}}; the ∼2-pattern yields {{s1, s2, s3} , {s5} , {s4, s6}}; and the
∼3-pattern yields {{s1, s3} , {s2} , {s4} , {s5} , {s6}}.
For a ∼q-pattern pq = (p(q,1), . . . , p(q,k)) and a subset T ⊆ S, we define the partial
pattern pq|T = (z1, . . . , zk), where zi = p(q,i) if si ∈ T , and zi = 0 otherwise. Given a
partial plan pi : T → U , we say that p|T is a NER-pattern for pi if p|T with all coordinates
with 0 values removed is a NER-pattern for pi. We therefore have that if p is a NER-
pattern for a plan pi, then p|T is a NER-pattern for pi restricted to T .
Given Lemma 3.4 and Proposition 3.5, in order to solve a WSP instance with nested
equivalence constraints, it is enough to decide whether there exists a NER-pattern p
such that (i) p is realizable by some plan pi, and (ii) p is eligible (and hence pi is eligible)
for C = C1∪· · ·∪Cr. Our algorithm will therefore enumerate all possible NER-patterns
(except for certain NER-patterns that we show can be disregarded), and for each one
check whether the two conditions hold. As every realizable pattern is consistent, it is
enough to enumerate all consistent patterns.
We give the details of the enumeration in Section 3.2, and explain how to determine
whether p is realizable in Section 3.3. In the remainder of this section, we show it is
possible to check whether a NER-pattern p = (p1, . . . , pr) is eligible in time polyno-
mial in the input size N . Indeed, in polynomial time, we can construct a plan piq with
∼q-pattern pq for each q ∈ [r]. For each label p(q,i) ∈ pq, we may choose a distinct equiv-
alence class u∼q in U∼q and, for each step sj with p(q,j) = p(q,i), we assign sj to a user
from u∼q . By Lemma 3.4 and Proposition 3.2, p is eligible if and only if piq is eligible
for Cq for each q ∈ [r]. By assumption, eligibility of each piq can be checked in polyno-
mial time, which is enough to check the eligibility of p.8 Note, however, that piq may be
different for different q, so this simple check for eligibility does not give us a check for
realizability of p.
3.2. Enumerating Patterns
As a NER-pattern consists of a ∼q-pattern for each q ∈ [r], and each ∼q-pattern is
a vector of k integers from [k], it is clear that the number of (not necessarily consis-
8Clearly, it is not hard to check eligibility of p without explicitly constructing each piq , as we do in the
algorithm implementation, described in Section 4.
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tent) patterns is krk. Thus, we can naively enumerate all consistent patterns in time
O∗(krk) = O∗(2kr log k).
Recall the definition of a nested partition. Observe that a ∼q-pattern pq defines a
partition on the set of steps, where two steps are in the same block if and only if they
are assigned the same label by pq. Furthermore, if two ∼q-patterns pq and p′q define
the same partition, then pq is eligible for Cq if and only if p′q is eligible for Cq. Observe
also that for a consistent NER-pattern p = (p1, . . . pr), the tuple of partitions defined
by p1, . . . , pr respectively is a nested partition in r levels. It follows that in order to
determine if there exists a realizable and eligible NER-pattern, it is enough to consider
one pattern for each nested partition in r levels. The next theorem provides a bound
on the number of such patterns.
THEOREM 3.6. Let S be a set with |S| = k and let r be an integer. The number of
nested partitions of S in r levels is at most rk−1k!.
PROOF. Note that by Assumption 2 the blocks of the final partition Pr are singleton
sets.
First observe that each nested partition can be represented as a leaf-labeled rooted
tree embedded into the plane, with r + 1 levels and k leaves. Indeed, we can create
such a tree as follows. Create a root node; then for every block in P1, create one node
representing the block as a child of the root; then recursively, for every block B in Pi,
1 < i ≤ r + 1, we create a node at level i + 1 of the tree representing the block, and
make it a child of the node representing the block B′ ∈ Pi−1 for which B ⊆ B′. Hence
it suffices to bound the number of such trees.
We give a characteristic of the tree as a permutation of [k] followed by k− 1 integers
between 1 and r. Clearly, there are exactly rk−1k! such characteristics; we will be able
to reproduce the tree from the characteristic, which will finish the proof.
Leaves of the tree listed from left to right form a permutation of [k]. For a fixed
permutation pi = x1 . . . xk, to recreate the full shape of the tree, it suffices to have
k− 1 numbers between 1 and r as follows. For every pair of elements xi, xi+1, we write
down the distance between the corresponding leaves and their lowest common ances-
tor. Hence we have described a characteristic of the tree, from a set of size k!rk−1, from
which we can recreate the tree and hence also the nested partition. This completes the
proof.
It remains to show how we can enumerate NER-patterns in such a way that we cover
exactly one pattern for each nested partition on r levels.
THEOREM 3.7. We can enumerate a set of NER-patterns in such a way that there is
a NER-pattern for every nested partition on r levels in time O∗(2k log(rk)).
PROOF. We begin by defining an empty partial NER-pattern p = (0, . . . ,0), where 0
is a pattern in which all k entries are 0. We then recursively replace 0 entries in p to
obtain a complete NER-pattern (in which no entry is 0). This replacement is performed
using a recursive, backtracking algorithm that outputs every complete NER-pattern,
as implemented by the pseudocode in Algorithm 3 (on page 20).
Let p′ = (p′1, . . . , p′r), where p′i = (p′(i,1), . . . , p
′
(i,k)) for i ∈ [k], be a partial NER-pattern.
If p′ is complete, then we add p′ to the output of the algorithm. Otherwise, there exists
a largest q ≤ r such that p′q is not complete. Choose i ∈ [k] such that p′(q,i) = 0. Then
define k′ = max{p′(q,j) : j ∈ [k]}+ 1 and, for every a ∈ [k′]:
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(1) for every j ∈ [k], if p′(q+1,j) = p′(q+1,i) then set p′(q,j) = a;9
(2) make a recursive call with the resulting NER-pattern.
To prove that this algorithm enumerates all required patterns, it is enough to show
that for each possible plan pi the algorithm generates a NER-pattern p which is a NER-
pattern for pi. So consider a plan pi. At every recursion point, corresponding to the
specification of a value p′(q,i), there is exactly one value of a consistent with pi (either
k′ = 1 in which case there is no choice; or p′q places si in the same equivalence class as
some previously specified step sj ; or si must be placed in a new equivalence class and
we let a = k′). It is also clear that this recursive path is not aborted. Hence the process
results in a complete NER-pattern p for pi.
To bound the running time of our algorithm, we argue very similarly to show that
the number of leaves in the algorithm’s pattern generation tree T is bounded by the
number of distinct nested partitions. Clearly, for an upper bound on the running time
we may assume that no recursive search branch is aborted (i.e., every possible pattern
is eligible). Then we find, as above, that for every nested partition P, we can trace
exactly one path from the root of the calling tree to a leaf, where at every point there
is exactly one value p′(q,i) = a that is consistent with P. We also find that every leaf of
T , corresponding to a complete NER-pattern p, corresponds to only exactly one nested
partition. Since every non-leaf node of T has at least two children, the total number
of nodes in T is less than twice the number of leaves. Hence Theorem 3.6 bounds the
number of nodes by T by
2rk−1k! = O∗(2k log(rk)).
The total running time is bounded by a polynomial factor times this number, whence
the result follows.
3.3. Checking Realizability
Given a consistent NER-pattern p = (p1, . . . , pr), we must determine whether p can
be realized, given the authorization lists defined on users. Recall that each equiv-
alence relation ∼q defines a set of equivalence classes on U , and each ∼q-pattern
pq = (p(q,1), . . . , p(q,k)) defines a set of equivalence classes on S. We must determine
whether there exists a plan pi : S → U that: (i) has ∼q-pattern pq for each q ∈ [r]; and
(ii) assigns an authorized user to each step.
Informally, checking realizability is based on r authorization relations, one for each
equivalence relation ∼q, q ∈ [r]. These authorization relations may be visualized as
binary matrices in which the rows are indexed by equivalence classes in S and the
columns are indexed by equivalence classes in U . We say the users in equivalence
class V ⊆ U are collectively authorized for the steps in T ⊆ S if and only if for each
s ∈ T there exists a user u ∈ V such that user u is authorized for step s (that is,
s ∈ A(u)). Then the (T, V )-th entry in the matrix is set to 1 if and only if the users in
the equivalence class V are collectively authorized for the steps in T .
We illustrate, informally, what an algorithm for checking realizability must do, using
our running example with NER-pattern
((1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2), (1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 2), (1, 2, 1, 3, 4, 5)).
9Thus, p′
(q,i)
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This gives rise to the following authorization relations (from which we omit set delim-
iters and zero entries in the interests of clarity):
∼3 u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 u6 u7 u8 u9
s1s3 1 1
s2 1 1 1
s5 1 1 1
s4 1 1
s6 1 1







From each of these authorization relations, we must construct a mapping such that
each set indexing a row is mapped to a distinct set indexing a column (by definition
of a pattern). And the three mappings, must be “coherent” in the following sense: if
T ⊆ S is an equivalence class induced by pattern pq and is mapped to an equivalence
class V ⊆ U induced by ∼q, then there must exist an injective mapping from the
equivalence classes into which T is partitioned by pq+1 to the equivalence classes of
∼q+1 that partition V . Clearly, this is possible for the three relations above:
pi1(s1s2s3s5) = u1u2u3u4u5, pi1(s4s6) = u6u7u8u9
pi2(s1s2s3) = u1u2, pi2(s5) = u3u4u5, pi2(s4s6) = u8u9
pi3(s1s3) = u1, pi3(s2) = u2, pi3(s5) = u4, pi3(s4) = u8, pi3(s6) = u9
We may construct the final plan pi from these mappings in the obvious way.
To illustrate that not every eligible NER-pattern is realizable, consider the NER-
pattern
((1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2), (1, 2, 1, 3, 2, 3), (1, 2, 1, 3, 4, 5)).
(This NER-pattern only differs from our running example in p2, which now requires
that steps s2 and s5 be performed by users in the same section.) In this case, we derive
the following authorization relation for pattern p2 and ∼2:




Notice that it is now impossible to find an injective mapping (since we cannot map s2s5
and s4s6 to distinct equivalence classes in U ).
Additionally, a pattern may not be realizable because it is impossible to find a co-
herent set of mappings. Consider, the following simple example with NER-pattern
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((1, 1, 2, 2), (1, 2, 3, 4)):
∼2 u1 u2 u3 u4
s1 1 1 1






Clearly we can find an injective mapping for ∼1, with either of the following mappings
being acceptable:
pi1(s1s2) = u1u2, pi1(s3s4) = u3u4; pi
′
1(s1s2) = u3u4, pi
′
1(s3s4) = u1u2.
However, there is no injective mapping pi2 for ∼2 such that pi1 and pi2 are coherent or
such that pi′1 and pi2 are coherent: whether we choose pi1 or pi′1, there is no way we can
map s3 and s4 to distinct authorized users.10
Our algorithm for checking realizability is recursive. Essentially, it computes autho-
rization relations of the kind illustrated in the above tables. However, we insert a 1 in
the (T, V )-th entry in the table for ∼q if and only if
1. the users in V are collectively authorized for the steps in T , and
2. there exists an injective mapping from the equivalence classes in T induced by pq+1
to the equivalence classes in V induced by ∼q+1.





since there is no injective mapping from the equivalence classes comprising s3s4 in p2
(that is s3 and s4) to the equivalence classes comprising u1u2 in ∼2 (u1 and u2) or to
the equivalence classes comprising u3u4 (u3 and u4). Hence there can be no injective
mapping for ∼1.
Essentially, our algorithm recursively computes coherent authorization relations for
∼r, ∼r−1, . . . , ∼1, using information from ∼q+1 to compute ∼q. If we are able to find an
injective mapping for the authorization relation for ∼1 then the pattern is realizable.
In our algorithm, each of these coherent authorization relations is represented as a
bipartite graph: the partite sets comprise the indexing sets for the rows and columns;
and an edge connects two vertices if and only if there is a 1 in the corresponding entry
in the coherent authorization relation. A bipartite graph G with vertex set X ∪Y has a
matching covering X if there exist a set of edges M ⊆ E(G) such that no pair of edges
has a vertex in common and for every x ∈ X there exists an edge in M containing
x. Hence, a matching defines an injective mapping from X to Y . Then a pattern is
realizable if, for each of these bipartite graphs, there exists a matching covering X.
More formally, fix a consistent NER-pattern p = (p1 = ((p(1,1), . . . , p(1,k)), . . . , pr =
(p(r,1), . . . , p(r,k))). For notational convenience, let ∼0 be the trivial equivalence relation
having a single equivalence class equal to U , and let p0 = (1, . . . , 1) be the pattern
assigning every step to the same label.
10Note, however, that the NER-pattern ((1, 2, 1, 2), (1, 2, 3, 4)), for example, is realizable.
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:18 Jason Crampton et al.
Definition 3.8. Given a consistent NER-pattern p, an integer q ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r−1}, an
equivalence class T induced by pq, and an equivalence class V induced by ∼q, we define
the q-level bipartite graph G(T, V, q) as follows: Let T denote the equivalence classes
induced by pq+1 and contained in T , and let the vertices of G(T, V, q) be T ∪ V ∼q+1. For
each equivalence class T ′ ∈ T , and for each equivalence class V ′ ∈ V ∼q+1, let G(T, V, q)
have an edge between T ′ and V ′ if and only if there exists an authorized partial plan
pi′ : T ′ → V ′ such that pq′ |T ′ is a ∼q′ -pattern for pi′, for each q′ ≥ q + 1.
LEMMA 3.9. Given a consistent NER-pattern p, an integer q ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r − 1}, an
equivalence class T induced by pq, and an equivalence class V induced by ∼q, the fol-
lowing are equivalent:
(i) There exists an authorized partial plan pi : T → V such that pq′ |T is a ∼q′ -pattern
for pi, for each q′ ≥ q;
(ii) G(T, V, q) has a matching covering T .
PROOF. (i)⇒ (ii):
Suppose such a plan pi exists. Then consider an equivalence class T ′ induced by pq+1
and contained in T . It follows from the definition of pi that pq′ |T ′ is a ∼q′ -pattern for
pi|T ′ for each q′ ≥ q + 1.
As pq+1|T is a ∼q+1-pattern for pi, and T ′ is an equivalence class induced by pq+1, it
must be the case that T ′ is an equivalence class induced by ≈pi,q+1, which implies that
pi|T ′(T ′) is contained in an equivalence class induced by ∼q+1. Let V (T ′) denote this
equivalence class. Then pi|T ′ is an authorized partial plan pi|T ′ : T ′ → V (T ′) such that
pq′ |T ′ is a ∼q′ -pattern for pi|T ′ , for each q′ ≥ q+1. Thus there is an edge between T ′ and
V (T ′) in G(T, V, q).
Furthermore, for two different equivalence classes T ′, T ′′ induced by pq+1 and con-
tained in T , we have that T ′ and T ′′ are different equivalence classes induced by≈pi,q+1,
and so pi(T ′) and pi(T ′′) are contained in different equivalence classes induced by pq+1.
Thus, V (T ′) 6= V (T ′′). By taking the edge between T ′ and V (T ′) for each equivalence
class T ′, we get a matching covering T .
(ii)⇒ (i):
Suppose we have a matching covering T . Then for each equivalence class T ′ induced
by pq+1 and contained in T , there exists an equivalence class V (T ′) induced by ∼q+1
and contained in V , such that there is an edge between T ′ and V (T ′) in G(T, V, q), and
furthermore V (T ′) 6= V (T ′′) for any T ′ 6= T ′′.
Then by definition of G(V, T, q), for each T ′ there exists an authorized partial plan
pi′ : T ′ → V (T ′) such that pq′ |T ′ is a ∼q′ -pattern for pi′, for each q′ ≥ q+ 1. Let pi : T → V
be the union of these partial plans. Then pi is clearly an authorized partial plan. It
remains to show that pq′ |T is a ∼q′ -pattern for pi, for each q′ ≥ q.
Consider si, sj ∈ T . We will show that for each q′ ≥ q, si, sj are in the same class
induced by pq′ if and only if they are in the same class induced by ≈pi,q′ i.e. pi(si) ∼q′
pi(sj). It follows that pq′ |T is a ∼q′ -pattern for pi, as required.
If q′ = q, then by construction si, sj ∈ T and pi(si), pi(sj) ∈ V . Thus si, sj are in
the same class induced by pq and pi(si), pi(sj) are in the same class induced by ∼q,
and we are done. Otherwise, we have q′ ≥ q + 1. In this case, suppose that si, sj are
in the same class T ′ induced by pq+1. Then there exists an authorized partial plan
pi′ : T ′ → V (T ′) such that pq′ |T ′ is a ∼q′ -pattern for pi′, and in particular pi′(si) ∼q′ pi′(sj)
if and only if si, sj are in the same class induced by pq′ . By construction, pi(si) = pi′(si)
and pi(sj) = pi′(sj), and so we are done. Finally, suppose that si, sj are different classes
induced by pq+1. Then as p is consistent and q′ ≥ q+1, they are also in different classes
induced by pq′ . Furthermore, by construction pi(si) and pi(sj) are in different classes
induced by ∼q+1, and therefore in different classes induced by pq′ , and we are done.
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By definition, S and U are the only equivalence classes induced by p0 and ∼0, respec-
tively. Thus, Lemma 3.9 implies that there exists an authorized plan pi : S → U such
that p is a NER-pattern for pi if and only if the 0-level bipartite graph G(S,U, 0) has
a matching covering all equivalence classes of S induced by p1. For q < r, Lemma 3.9
and Definition 3.8 imply that G(T, V, q) has an edge between T ′ and V ′ if and only if
G(T ′, V ′, q + 1) has a matching covering T ′.
Algorithm 1: isRealizable(W,p, T, V, i)
1 if i = r then






8 for each equivalence class T ′ in T induced by pi+1 do
9 for each equivalence class V ′ in V induced by ∼i+1 do
10 if isRealizable(T ′, V ′, i+ 1) = SAT then
11 Add edge between T ′ and V ′;




Together, these observations lead to a recursive algorithm (isRealizable, described in
Algorithm 1) to decide whether a NER-pattern p is realizable. Given a level q, an equiv-
alence class T induced by pq, and an equivalence class V induced by ∼q, our algorithm
will return SAT if there exists an authorized partial plan pi : T → V such that pq′ |T is
a ∼q′ -pattern for pi, for each q′ ≥ q. Otherwise, the algorithm will return UNSAT. For
q ≤ r−1, the algorithm generates a bipartite graph and checks it for a matching, where
each edge of the graph is determined by a recursive call to the algorithm for q + 1.
To analyze the running time of the isRealizable algorithm, observe that a single call
to the algorithm requires polynomial time:
— checking whether a bipartite graph has a matching covering one partite set can be
done in polynomial time; and
— for q = r, the algorithm performs a simple check to see whether the single user v
(since, for q = r, V = {v} for some v ∈ U ) is authorized for all steps in T , which also
takes polynomial time.
Moreover, for each tuple (T ′, V ′, q + 1), isRealizable(T ′, V ′, q + 1) is called at most once
(during an iteration of isRealizable(T, V, q), where T is the equivalence class induced
by pq that contains T ′, and V is the equivalence class induced by ∼q that contains
V ′). Thus the running time is bounded by a polynomial multiplied by the number of
tuples of the form (T, V, q), where T is an equivalence class induced by pq and V is an
equivalence class induced by ∼q. As |S| = k and |U | = n, the number of such tuples is
at most rkn, and so we have the following result:
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Algorithm 2: main(W )
input : WSP instance W = (S,U,A, {∼1, . . . ,∼r}, C)
output: UNSAT or SAT
1 p0 = (1, . . . , 1);
2 for each q ∈ [r] do
3 pq = (0, . . . , 0);
4 p = (p0, p1, . . . , pr);
5 return patternBacktrack(W,p, r);
THEOREM 3.10. Given a NER-pattern p, we can determine whether p is realizable
in polynomial time.
3.4. Proof of Theorem 3.1 and FPT Algorithm
In order to solve a WSP instance with nested class-independent constraints in r lev-
els, by Lemma 3.4 and Proposition 3.5, it is enough to decide whether there exists a
NER-pattern p such that (i) p is realizable, and (ii) p is eligible for C = C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Cr.
By the discussion in Section 3.2, in order to check if there is a realizable and eligible
NER-pattern, it is enough to consider one pattern for each nested partition in r levels.
By Theorem 3.7, such a set of NER-patterns can be enumerated in time O∗(2k log(rk)).
For each pattern in this set, we can decide whether it is realizable in polynomial time
by Theorem 3.10, and we can decide whether it is eligible in polynomial time as dis-
cussed at the end of Section 3.1. Thus, overall, we can solve the WSP instance in time
O∗(2k log(rk)), as required.
Algorithms 1 – 3 provide pseudo-code for our FPT algorithm. Note that in the imple-
mentation of our algorithm, as an additional heuristic we check whether partial pat-
terns are eligible (i.e. the pattern constructed so far does not imply that a constraint
will be violated), reducing the search space by immediately discarding ineligible pat-
terns.
Algorithm 3: patternBacktrack(W,p, q)
1 if q = 0 then
2 return isRealizable(W,p, S, U, 0);
3 else
4 if pq is complete then
5 return patternBacktrack(W,p, q − 1);
6 else
7 Choose i such that p(q,i) = 0;
8 for each a ∈ {1, . . . ,max{p(q,j) : j ∈ [k]}+ 1} do
9 if q = r then
10 p(q,i) = a;
11 else
12 for each j such that p(q+1,j) = p(q+1,i) do
13 p(q,j) = a;
14 if pq is eligible and patternBacktrack(W,p, q) = SAT then
15 return SAT;
16 return UNSAT;
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4. ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS
Thus far, we have investigated the worst-case complexity of an algorithm to solve WSP
in the presence of CI constraints. However, there can be a huge difference between the
performance of an algorithm in principle and the performance of its actual implemen-
tation as a computer code [Bartz-Beielstein et al. 2010; Myrvold and Kocay 2011]. In
this section, we discuss an implementation of the algorithm described in the previous
section, its performance on synthetic instances of WSP, and compare its performance
with that of the pseudo-Boolean SAT solver SAT4J. We refer to the implementation of
our algorithm as PB4CI – pattern-backtracking for class-independent (constraints).
The goals of our experimental work are to:
— evaluate the performance of PB4CI on a range of instances of WSP with CI con-
straints; and
— compare the performance of PB4CI with a state-of-the-art off-the-shelf SAT solver
on the same instances.
We chose the solver SAT4J as this has been used in previous work on WSP [Cohen et al.
2015; Karapetyan et al. 2015; Wang and Li 2010]. We hope to confirm our intuition
that PB4CI would perform well on instances in which the constraints meant there
were relatively few eligible patterns, while SAT4J would perform well on instances for
which there were many possible solutions.
In Section 4.1, we describe the generation of test instances, in particular focusing on
our choice of parameters. In Section 4.2, we present the results of our experiments and
compare the performance of PB4CI and SAT4J. In the appendix we provide some fur-
ther information about the implementation of PB4CI, including our branching heuris-
tics, and details of the encoding of WSP with CI constraints as a pseudo-Boolean satis-
fiability problem. The FPT algorithm’s executable code and experimental data set are
publicly available [Gagarin et al. 2015].
4.1. Generation of Test Instances
To be able to provide a meaningful analysis of experimental results, we decided, as in
prior experimental work on WSP [Cohen et al. 2015; Karapetyan et al. 2015], to have a
small number of constraint types. In particular, we focus on the special case r = 2: that
is, we use a single equivalence relation ∼ on U (in addition to the identity relation). We
use constraints of the following types: (i) not-equals constraints (s, s′, 6=); (ii) equiva-
lence constraints (s, s′,∼); (iii) non-equivalence constraints (s, s′,); and (iv) at-most-3
constraints with a scope Q ⊆ S of size 5.11 The values we used for the parameters k
and n were chosen by inspection of case studies provided by standards bodies and the
academic literature. In particular, the number of steps in the workflows in the BPM
Academic Initiative repository12 and the workflow patterns database13 ranges in value
between 10 and 50. Empirical access control studies suggest that the number of roles in
an organization, typically a similar order of magnitude to the number of steps in work-
flow specifications, is an order of magnitude smaller than the number of users [Schaad
et al. 2001]. For every user u ∈ U we generated A(u) by choosing the size α of A(u)
from the set {1, 2, . . . , dk/2e} randomly and uniformly and then picking α distinct steps
from S also randomly and uniformly.
11A constraint of this form is satisfied by a plan pi if pi assigns at most three users to the steps in Q.
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We generated a range of WSP instances with approximately equal numbers of sat-
isfiable and unsatisfiable instances. We did this by varying the number of constraints
of each type. The two parameters we varied substantially in order to generate our test
instances were the number of constraints of the form (s, s′,) and the number of at-
most-3 constraints. The satisfaction of constraint (s, s′,) implies the satisfaction of
the not-equals constraint (s, s′, 6=). Therefore, we do not vary the number of not-equals
constraints a great deal (in contrast to existing work in the literature [Cohen et al.
2015]). Conversely, satisfaction of constraint (s, s′,=) implies the satisfaction of con-
straint (s, s′,∼) for any equivalence relation ∼. Thus the inclusion of constraints of the
form (s, s′,∼) usually does not make an instance more difficult to satisfy. Therefore,
although our algorithm solves instances that include constraints of the form (s, s′,∼),
we use few (if any) constraints of this form in our experiments.
In total, we generated 525 = 5×3×7×5 test instances, which ranged from relatively
“lightly constrained” instances, which are likely to be satisfiable and easy to solve, to
“highly constrained” instances, which are likely to be unsatisfiable and also (relatively)
easy to solve. In between these extremes, there are instances that may or may not be
satisfiable and are likely to be difficult to solve. Of the 525 test instances we generated,
250 are satisfiable (47.62%). The distribution of satisfiable and unsatisfiable instances
with respect to the number of steps is shown in Figure 2. The values of all parameters
used in the generation of our test instances are summarized in Table II.
Table II. Parameters and their values used in the experiments
Parameter Values
Number of steps, k 20, 25, 30, 35, 40
Number of users, n 10k
Number of equivalence classes of users, c 2k
Number of not-equals constraints (s, s′, 6=) k ± 5i, i = 0, 1
Number of at-most-3 constraints k ± 5i, i = 0, 1, 2, 3
Number of equivalence constraints (s, s′,∼) k
5
− 4
Number of non-equivalence constraints (s, s′,) k ± 5i, i = 0, 1, 2
















Fig. 2. Distribution of satisfiable and unsatisfiable instances by the number of steps k.
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All the constraints, authorizations, and equivalence classes of users are generated
for each instance separately and uniformly at random. The random generation of au-
thorizations, not-equals, and at-most-3 constraints uses existing techniques [Cohen
et al. 2015]. The generation of equivalence and non-equivalence constraints has to
be controlled more carefully to ensure that an instance is not trivially unsatisfiable
and does not have too many vacuous constraints. For example, we need to discard a
constraint of the form (s, s′,) if we have already generated a constraint of the form
(s, s′,∼).
The equivalence classes of users are generated by linearly ordering the user set and
then splitting the list into intervals of consecutive users. The number of users in each
class varies from 3 to 7, chosen uniformly at random and adjusted, if necessary, so that
the total number of users in all the classes is equal to n.
4.2. Experimental Results
All our experiments were performed on a MacBook Pro computer having a 2.6 GHz
Intel Core i5 processor, 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3 RAM, and running Mac OS X 10.9.5.
PB4CI and SAT4J were each given one hour to solve each instance of the problem. One
of three outcomes was possible: the instance was solved and found to be satisfiable;
the instance was solved and found to be unsatisfiable; the instance was not solved






























































































































Fig. 3. Sample of test results for k = 25 steps. An Instance ID a.b, denotes an instance with a at-most-3
constraints and b non-equivalence constraints. If no node is shown for a particular instance then the instance
remained unsolved.
Figure 3 reports detailed representative results obtained for 35 instances, of which 17
are satisfiable. Each instance has 25 steps, 30 not-equals constraints and 1 equivalence
constraint.
— Each instance is labeled with an identifier of the form a.b, where a and b denote the
number of at-most-3 constraints and non-equivalence constraints, respectively.
— Satisfiable instances are represented by unfilled nodes; unsatisfiable instances by
filled nodes.
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— Times to solve the instances using PB4CI are represented by triangles; times using
SAT4J are represented by circles.
— If no node is shown for a particular instance then the instance remained unsolved.
For example, PB4CI failed to solve (satisfiable) instance 10.15, while SAT4J failed
to solve (unsatisfiable) instance 25.25.
More generally, PB4CI successfully solves around 95% of the test instances (502 in-
stances out of 525), while SAT4J solves fewer than 50% (253 instances). The results
are summarized in Figures 4–6, which show the success rates for PB4CI and SAT4J
on all instances, unsatisfiable instances and satisfiable instances, respectively. These
figures, together with Figure 3, clearly illustrate the following points:
— SAT4J is much more effective on satisfiable instances than on unsatisfiable ones;
— PB4CI is extremely effective in solving highly constrained instances and unsatisfi-
able instances, particularly in comparison to SAT4J;
— SAT4J is more effective, on average, than PB4CI on satisfiable instances with small
numbers of constraints, although for many such instances PB4CI is faster than
SAT4J, and any advantage SAT4J enjoys over PB4CI on satisfiable instances dis-
appears for instances with more than 30 steps.


















Fig. 4. Performance of SAT4J vs PB4CI on all instances
It is evident from Figures 3–6 that PB4CI is least effective for lightly constrained
instances, whereas SAT4J is least effective on highly constrained instances. This re-
flects the different strategies used by PB4CI and SAT4J. PB4CI explores a search
space that is, in the worst case, exponential in k. If the instance is lightly constrained
that search space will necessarily be large, because most patterns will be eligible. In
contrast, SAT4J is a more conventional solver, presumably with many heuristics and
optimizations geared towards solving pseudo-Boolean satisfiability problems. If the in-
stance is highly constrained, the encoding of the instance will contain more variables
and SAT4J will have to explore many more possible assignments if it is to find a solu-
tion (and will have to explore every possible solution if the instance is unsatisfiable).
In contrast, the number of possible patterns – the size of the search space for PB4CI –
will be rather small (irrespective of whether the instance is satisfiable or not). The con-
trast in performance is particularly noticeable on unsatisfiable instances: for k = 40,
for example, PB4CI solves all unsatisfiable instances, while SAT4J is only able to solve
one instance.
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Fig. 5. Performance of SAT4J vs PB4CI on unsatisfiable instances


















Fig. 6. Performance of SAT4J vs PB4CI on satisfiable instances
Table III shows summary statistics for all the experiments, including average and
median CPU times. Where an instance is not solved, we take the time at which exe-
cution was halted – either 60 minutes or the point at which the computer’s memory
was exhausted. Thus, reported average and median times represent estimated lower
bounds on these statistics: if more time or memory had been available to run these
instances to completion, execution times would have been higher.
Despite the evidence that PB4CI is generally more effective and quicker at solving
WSP instances, we recognize that SAT4J is quicker, sometimes orders of magnitude
quicker, for some satisfiable WSP instances (see instances 10.35, 15.15 and 15.30 in
Figure 3). This is due to a relatively small number of constraints in these instances,
which requires PB4CI to generate a large number of eligible patterns. Since pattern
realizability checking is mostly independent from eligibility testing and quite time
consuming, PB4CI may spend a lot of time trying to find a realizable pattern in the
large set of all eligible patterns. Conversely, there are many satisfiable assignments
for these instances, so SAT4J’s heuristics are likely find solutions for such instances
rather quickly.
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Table III. Summary statistics for k ∈ {20, 25, 30, 35, 40}
SAT4J PB4CI








20 SAT 71 0 11.55 1.28 71 0 0.005 0.003
UNSAT 27 7 1,312.95 1,022.01 34 0 0.008 0.006
Total 98 7 432.96 7.02 105 0 0.006 0.004
25 SAT 58 2 151.18 5.00 59 1 111.20 0.028
UNSAT 10 35 1,938.31 2,228.01 45 0 0.057 0.041
Total 68 37 917.09 86.06 104 1 63.57 0.036
30 SAT 44 2 229.09 13.56 40 6 368.41 0.38
UNSAT 5 54 2,061.26 2,145.42 59 0 0.83 0.26
Total 49 56 1,258.59 1,667.80 99 6 161.86 0.28
35 SAT 33 7 644.28 151.22 33 7 443.54 4.08
UNSAT 2 63 2,023.41 2,010.80 65 0 2.82 1.95
Total 35 70 1,498.03 1,808.43 98 7 170.72 2.48
40 SAT 21 12 1,014.75 627.31 24 9 403.74 111.10
UNSAT 1 71 1,834.73 1,855.97 72 0 31.38 12.02
Total 22 83 1,577.02 1,794.52 96 9 148.41 13.98
Finally, we note that at least one of the solvers was able to (correctly) solve ev-
ery instance in Figure 3 in no more than 11 seconds (and usually much quicker).14
In practice, therefore, it would be prudent to implement both solvers in a workflow
management system and run both solvers on a WSP instance, terminating whichever
solver hasn’t finished when the other one returns a result.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce the concept of a class-independent constraint. In their own
right, CI constraints represent a significant generalization of user-independent con-
straints, which are, themselves, highly expressive (and sufficient to model all con-
straints defined in the ANSI RBAC standard). However, the use of nested equiva-
lence relations and CI constraints defined over those relations, provides an even richer
framework for workflow constraints and substantially extends the range of real-world
business requirements that can be modeled.
Nevertheless, an expressive framework is of limited use if reasoning about its effects
is computationally infeasible. We have established that the introduction of CI con-
straints and nested equivalence relations does not affect the fixed-parameter tractabil-
ity of WSP. In particular, we have designed an FPT algorithm for WSP with class-
independent constraints, providing a more careful analysis of the worst-case complex-
ity than that given in the preliminary version of this paper [Crampton et al. 2015].
Again, a theoretical algorithm to solve a problem is of little use if its realization in
practice is very slow. Accordingly, we developed an implementation of our algorithm
and compared its performance with that of SAT4J, an off-the-shelf state-of-the-art
pseudo-Boolean SAT solver, on a wide range of test instances with realistic parameter
values. Our results demonstrate that our FPT algorithm is useful in practice for WSP
with class-independent constraints, notably for instances that are highly constrained.
In this case, the number of patterns, which characterizes the size of the search space
for our algorithm, is small. For such instances, conventional solvers like SAT4J have
to explore a large number of assignments of users to steps. The performance of such
14The times taken for instances with k < 25 are correspondingly faster, as can be seen in Table III.
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solvers is particularly poor for unsatisfiable instances because of the combinatorial
blow-up in the size of the search space.
There remain opportunities for further work in this area. In particular, there are
problems that are closely related to WSP that have been studied in the literature,
typically only in the context of simple separation-of-duty and binding-of-duty con-
straints [Basin et al. 2014; Yang et al. 2014]. Of particular interest here is the work of
Basin et al. [2014] and their use of release points to limit the scope of constraints in
workflows with loops. It would be interesting to study workflow satisfiability (from the
perspective of fixed-parameter tractability) when the workflow specification includes
release points and user- and class-independent constraints.
In this paper we have focused on organizations with a hierarchical structure. While
this is true of many organizations, modern management structures are often more
complex so we would like to investigate whether it is possible to extend our work to
accommodate richer organizational structures. Moreover, our work assumes that the
organizational units partition the user population. Again, this may be true of many
organizations, but not all. We would like to investigate team-based constraints, where
each team comprises users from different parts of an organization but the union of
those teams is neither disjoint nor the entire user population.
In addition, one can imagine that an organization might incorporate multiple hier-
archical structures, defined in terms of partitions of the user set. Our current approach
works for a single hierarchy, based on nested partitions. It would be interesting to see
whether our approach can accommodate multiple hierarchies using different nested
partitions, thus enriching workflow specifications further. Of course, the number of hi-
erarchies and the maximum value of their respective depths become parameters to the
problem but, provided these parameters are all small relative to the size of the user
set, we may still be able to obtain useful theoretical results and reasonably efficient
algorithms.
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Our implementation of the theoretical FPT algorithm in C++ uses a number of heuris-
tics in order to improve performance, which we now describe in more detail.
The FPT algorithm and pattern generation used by Cohen et al. [2015] assumed
a fixed ordering s1, . . . , sk of steps in S. One of the key advantages of the pattern-
backtracking framework used in our FPT algorithm is that we can consider the steps
as arbitrarily permuted at any stage of the recursion. This flexibility is used in the
choice of steps for branching during the recursion, and allows us to reduce the search
space of NER-patterns dramatically. During the construction of p2 = p= and p1 = p∼,
our algorithm uses a heuristic subroutine to decide which zero-valued label p(2,i) and
p(1,i), i ∈ [k], respectively, should be considered next. Our heuristic simply chooses a
zero-valued label corresponding to a step of maximum weight. The weights for steps
with zero-valued labels in p2 and p1 are computed separately, depending on the type of
constraints in the WSP instance (∼-independent or UI) and properties of the problem
instance. Also, in the current version of the algorithm, the weights of steps for branch-
ing are computed locally, in each iteration, which is different from the approaches used
by Crampton et al. [2015] in which weights are pre-computed and used for every iter-
ation.
For the two types of constraints used in our computational experiments, the weights
are computed as follows. The computation of weight for p(2,i) is based on the type,
number, and current state of UI constraints containing the corresponding step si, i ∈
[k], with larger weight given if other steps in the constraint have already been assigned
to some non-zero values in the corresponding p2-pattern. Since a constraint (s, s′,)
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implies (s, s′, 6=), such constraints accounted for in these weight computations as well.
The computation of weight for p(1,i) is based on the type, number, and current state of
∼-independent constraints containing the corresponding step si, i ∈ [k]. Much larger
weight is given for inclusion in the scope of the equivalence constraints and larger
weight given when the other step in the constraint is already assigned to some non-
zero value in the corresponding partial p1-pattern. The intuition behind these weights
and the corresponding choice of steps in iteration is that using a step participating in
more, “more influential,” and “more satisfied” constraints is more beneficial for pruning
the search space branches, and this usually reduces the pattern search space more
effectively. The precise values of parameters for weight functions have been tuned
empirically. In a certain sense, this approach is a development of the approach used
in Karapetyan et al. [2015], and often gives better results than the approach with
global weights used by Crampton et al. [2015].
Checking realizability of complete NER-patterns is a subtle procedure involving the
use of efficient data structures and construction of corresponding bipartite graphs
on two levels. The construction of bipartite graphs itself is one of the most time
consuming-parts of the code. The algorithm searching for required matchings in the
bipartite graph uses a modified version of the Hungarian algorithm and data struc-
tures [Kocay and Kreher 2004], in combination with some simple speed-ups and Propo-
sition 1 used by Karapetyan et al. [2015]. In case of satisfiable instances of the prob-
lem, when the existence of required matchings in the bipartite graphs is confirmed,
the algorithm uses a modification of the construction of bipartite graphs and finding
matchings subroutines to find an actual solution assignment.
A.2. Reduction of WSP to a Pseudo-Boolean Satisfiability Problem
In order to compare the performance of our algorithm with SAT4J, we transformed
our test instances of WSP into pseudo-Boolean satisfiability problem instances, which
we then solved using the off-the-shelf SAT solver SAT4J. We now briefly describe this
transformation, which involves the introduction of a number of binary (0, 1)-variables
and pseudo-Boolean constraints. Similar transformations have been used elsewhere
[Cohen et al. 2015; Karapetyan et al. 2015; Wang and Li 2010].
— For each step s ∈ S and each user in A(s), we define a binary variable xu,s. Assign-
ments to these variables will be used to represent a plan pi, where xu,s = 1 if and
only if pi(s) = u.
— For each equivalence class X ⊆ U (with respect to ∼) and each step s ∈ S, we define
a binary variable zX,s, where zX,s = 1 if and only if pi(s) ∈ X.
— For each at-most constraint c with scope Q and each user u ∈ U , we define a binary
variable yu,c, where yu,c = 1 if an only if xu,s = 1 for some s ∈ Q.
— For each step s ∈ S, we require ∑u∈A(s) xu,s = 1 (to ensure that every step is
assigned to exactly one user).
— For every not-equals constraint (s, s′, 6=) and each user u ∈ A(s) ∩A(s′), we require
xu,s + xu,s′ 6 1 (to ensure that no user performs both s and s′).
— For every at-most constraint c with scope Q, every step s ∈ Q and every user u ∈
A(s), we require (i) xu,s 6 yu,c; and (ii)
∑
u∈U yu,c 6 3 (at most three users can be
assigned to steps in Q).
— For every step s ∈ S and every equivalence class X ⊆ U , we require∑
u∈X∩A(s) xu,s = zX,s.
— For each constraint (s, s′,∼) and equivalence class X ⊆ U , we require zX,s = zX,s′ .
— For each constraint (s, s′,) and equivalence class X ⊆ U , we require
zX,s + zX,s′ 6 1.
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